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“Scientia vera”? Holcot and Chaucer on Astrological Determinism, 
Magic, Talismans and Omens* 
 
In The House of Fame, Chaucer invites his readers to think of him as the sort of 
person who is uninterested in the acquirement of scientific knowledge. When the 
Eagle of Jupiter asks the poem’s narrator if he would like to “lere of sterres aught” 
(in effect offering him a miraculous opportunity to learn about the heavens from a 
superlatively authoritative source) his brusquely unenthusiastic reply is “Nay, 
certeynly… ryght naught” (994).1 His unconvincing explanation for this strangely 
incurious response is that he is now too old for such things; and he remains entirely 
unapologetic even when the Eagle points out that it is rather inconsistent of him to 
spend his time reading about all the various stellifications described in poetry, 
without being in any way interested in the actual placement of the stars in the sky: 
“For though thou have hem ofte on honde,/ Yet nostow not wher that they stonde” 
(1009-1010). The posture adopted by the Chaucerian narrator here is perhaps most 
readily explained as a more or less ironic disavowal or subversion of the claims to 
scientific authority found implicitly in the long tradition of literary texts depicting 
privileged journeys into the heavenly realms, such as the two works that Chaucer 
himself refers to immediately before this passage: The Marriage of Philology and 
Mercury by Martianus Capella and the Anticlaudianus by Alan of Lille.2 However, 
there is a biblical model that Chaucer might also have had in mind at this point: the 
account of the privileged understanding of the universe that is granted to the 
narrator of the deutero-canonical Book of Wisdom (who was conventionally 
supposed to be King Solomon himself).  
In Wisdom 7, “Solomon” states that God: 
…is the guide of wisdom, and the director of the wise […and] he hath given 
me the true knowledge of the things that are [“horum quae sunt scientiam 
veram”]: to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the 
elements,/ The beginning, and ending, and midst of the times, the alterations 
of their courses, and the changes of seasons,/ The revolutions of the year, 
and the dispositions of the stars [“stellarum dispositiones”]. (Wisdom 7:15, 
17-19)3 
Here the richness of “Solomon’s” insight into the structure of the universe is 
presented as a measure of the extent to which human beings might aspire to a share 
in God’s omniscience. It is implicit that God’s perfect knowledge of the structure 
of the universe reflects the completeness of his power over the universe, so that to 
be able to partake in divine wisdom even to the extent of having some “true 
knowledge of the things that are” might be seen as a means of accessing, or 
vicariously exercising, divine power. This means that in rejecting the Eagle’s 
promise to describe “the dispositions of the stars” and spurning the opportunity to 
become, in effect, as wise as Solomon, the Chaucerian narrator denies any interest, 
not just in a “true knowledge” of the stars, but also the participation in God’s 
omnipotence that such a privileged degree of “true knowledge” might be taken to 
indicate or convey. 
There is at least one particular reason for thinking that this passage in The House 
of Fame might have been conditioned by Chaucer’s awareness of this Solomonic 
ideal of human wisdom: and this is that the Book of Wisdom was the subject of an 
extensive and widely circulated commentary by the Dominican friar Robert Holcot 
(d. 1349), and this is a book to which Chaucer is very likely to have had access.4 It 
was (in Jenny Swanson’s words) “one of the most popular commentaries of the late 
middle ages”; indeed, “it made [Holcot’s] name famous throughout medieval 
Europe, and surviving catalogues show that every well-stocked library came to have 
a copy.” 5  The likelihood that Chaucer knew the Wisdom-commentary was 
demonstrated long ago by Karen Petersen and Robert Pratt, who showed that it was 
probably a key source for the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.6 As Pratt puts it, “most of the 
comments on dreams made by Pertelote and Chauntecleer are based on two 
particular lectures in the commentary on the Book of Wisdom”.7 So, for example, 
Pertelote’s emphasis on the role of of humours in the shaping of dreams (VII 2923-
25) strongly resembles Holcot’s argument in Lection 103 that apparently 
meaningful dreams (“sompnia signatiua”) are sometimes caused by an excess of 
one of particular humour;8 her reference to “fume” (smoke) in VII 2924 seems to 
be a direct reflection of Holcot’s reference to “fumus melancolicus” in the same 
Lection;9 while her belief that a superfluity of choler causes people to dream of fire 
(VII 2927-30) echoes Holcot’s argument to the same effect in Lection 202.10 Both 
of the stories that are told in this Tale in order to illustrate the way in which dreams 
sometimes convey “true knowledge” of a particularly privileged kind (VII 2985-
3062, VII 3067-114) can be found in Holcot’s commentary (in Lections 103 and 
202 respectively), and it is at least possible that Chaucer was familiar with them 
from Holcot’s commentary, rather than (or in addition to) Holcot’s own source for 
them, Valerius Maximus’s Facta et dicta memorabilia. As Pratt explains, although 
there were many medieval treatises on dreams that the English poet might have 
known, “the treatise which, in the Nonnes Preestes Tale, Chaucer follows closely 
in theory after theory, detail after detail, and illustration after illustration, is Robert 
Holcot’s commentary on the Book of Wisdom”.11  
Despite the clear lead set by Petersen and Pratt, there has been relatively little 
scholarly exploration of the ways in which Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary might 
have influenced Chaucer’s writing in other ways (beyond the Nun’s Priest’s Tale), 
or of the potential significance of this relationship for our understanding of how 
Chaucer used his sources. 12  After all, Holcot is by no means a minor or 
uninteresting figure in the history of English literature or in the history of ideas. 
Beryl Smalley described him as the most “diversely gifted” of all the writers who 
formed the movement that she labelled as “the classicizing friars”. 13  She 
characterises him as “artistic, cultured, smiling, perhaps rather flippant and 
inconsequent too”,14 but, as Hester Goodenough Gelber emphasises, Holcot was a 
serious theologian too, “one of the major participants in the flowering of scholastic 
thought” in the fourteenth century and an “independent thinker who dared to 
challenge the opinions of the greatest scholastics”. 15  Indeed, in a theological 
context, Holcot is often identified as one of the principal antagonists of the English 
theologian whom Chaucer himself identified as a great authority on the vexed 
question of the relationship between human free-will and God’s foreknowledge, 
“Bisshop Bradwardyn” (NPT, VII 3242): i.e. Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349). It 
could be argued that the philosophical differences between Bradwardine and Holcot 
actually hinge on a disagreement about the relationship between God’s “true 
knowledge of the things that are” and the extent to which human beings can aspire 
to partake in such true knowledge. This is an issue to which I will return: but, for 
now, it perhaps enough to observe that the question of how closely Chaucer was 
influenced by Holcot is an important one, with substantial consequences for any 
assessment of the nature of the English poet’s engagement with fourteenth-century 
intellectual culture. 
Part of the reason why the relationship between Holcot and Chaucer has not been 
explored more fully is that much of what Chaucer is likely to have taken from 
Holcot can also be found in other sources: and this has perhaps encouraged the 
assumption that the correspondences between these two writers are essentially only 
coincidental, simply a consequence of the fact that they inhabited much the same 
cultural world. I would argue, by contrast, that Chaucer is in fact indebted to 
Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary at so many levels (for so many specific details and 
motifs, but also for whole complexes of ideas and distinct sequences of 
argument), that it actually makes much more sense to think of Holcot as playing a 
central role in the construction of Chaucer’s cultural horizons. 16  The case for 
Chaucer’s knowledge of Holcot’s work is cumulative: i.e., the more we find 
correspondences between the work of the two writers, the more the probability 
increases that each of these correspondences represents a conscious borrowing by 
Chaucer from Holcot.  
In this essay, I suggest two more particular moments in Chaucer’s work at which 
Holcot’s influence is likely. These are 1.) the catalogue of those who try, or pretend, 
to acquire privileged “knowledge of the things that are” by employing magical 
techniques of some kind in The House of Fame, 1259-70; and 2.) the Parson’s 
condemnation of similar practices and superstitions in the Parson’s Tale, X 602-
607. I will argue that these two passages directly depend (in overlapping ways) on 
two particular passages in Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary: specifically, in Lections 
98 and 159. However, what is perhaps most distinctive about Holcot’s approach to 
such issues as divination, omens and magic is the way that he chooses to involve 
them in a much a larger argument about the limits of human knowledge.  Chaucer’s 
indebtedness to Holcot is perhaps most significantly visible in the way that, for him 
too, the rejection of “superstitious” claims to any privileged insight into the working 
of the universe seems to be just part of a much deeper, and much more deeply 
philosophical, scepticism about the very possibility of human beings ever acquiring 
any “true knowledge of the things that are” solely by their own efforts. What human 
beings can achieve is so completely contingent on God (and God himself is so 
completely unlimited by any of the laws that operate within the universe) that it is 
simply not possible for human beings to earn such “true knowledge” for 
themselves, and their attempts to do so – whether through learning about the stars, 
magical rituals, the interpretation of dreams, or the observation of divinatory signs 
– are, according to both authors, illustrations ultimately of the same kind of human 
folly. From this perspective, it is necessary to consider, not just the particular 
passages in the Wisdom-commentary that seem to have given shape to what 
Chaucer says about astrological, magical and divinatory practices in The House of 
Fame and the Parson’s Tale, but also the part these passages play in the arguments 
of the Wisdom-commentary more generally. Matters are complicated further by the 
fact that in Lection 159, Holcot is himself dependent on St Augustine, developing 
the account of superstitious practices provided in On Christian Doctrine in such a 
way as to make it possible to think that Chaucer’s only immediate source was St 
Augustine. This is an example of the way in which the extent of Holcot’s influence 
on Chaucer is often obscured by the fact that Holcot himself is reliant on other 
sources. However, Holcot’s own distinctive spin on St Augustine’s thinking seems 
to have left its traces on Chaucer’s discussion of such practices in the Parson’s Tale, 
in such a way as to make clear that it is Holcot, rather than St Augustine, who must 
have been Chaucer’s immediate source. 
So – to return to the passage from Wisdom 7 with which I began – what exactly 
does Holcot have to say in response to “Solomon’s” claim to have been granted 
“true knowledge of the things that are”, including an understanding of “the 
dispositions of the stars”? The answer is that, like the Chaucerian narrator in The 
House of Fame, he is pointedly dismissive of the possibility of acquiring a complete 
understanding of the physics of the universe. Unlike the Chaucerian narrator, his 
justification is not that he himself is too superannuated to have any interest in such 
things, but that “true knowledge” of this kind is simply not humanly possible: 
It is asked whether there can be any knowledge of the movement of the stars. 
I think not, since if this were the case, then it is most likely that such 
knowledge would be possible in the case of the movements of the sun and 
the moon. But since no knowledge of their movements can be acquired, 
therefore no knowledge of other bodies can be acquired either. This 
assumption I can justify, since if it were possible to have any knowledge of 
movements of the sun and moon, then this would be something on which all 
the prophets would agree – i.e. that the sun moves continuously17  in a 
circular motion around the earth, that the sun is moved by a rotation of the 
firmament from east to west, and that the sun is never eclipsed whenever 
the moon is opposed to it – but all of this seems to be false according to holy 
scripture. (Lection 98: V, p. 86vb; O, fol. 151ra) 
He goes on to explain that even the apparently regular movements of the sun and 
moon can be disrupted in unpredictable ways, if God so chooses. Specifically, he 
points out: a.) that the sun’s movement in the sky is not inevitably continuous, 
because Joshua 10: 13 proves that it can be stopped (“the sun stood still in the midst 
of heaven, and hasted not to go down the space of one day”); b.) that the sun is not 
always moved by a rotation of the firmament from east to west, because 4 Kings 
20: 11 states that the prophet Isaiah made the sun go ten degrees backwards; and 
c.) that it is possible for the sun to be eclipsed even when the moon is opposed to it, 
because both Matthew and Luke say that there was an eclipse at the ninth hour of 
Good Friday, even though the sun and the moon were then opposed (Matthew 27: 
45; Luke 23: 45). If the rules that govern the movements even of the sun and the 
moon can be disrupted so fundamentally (as and when God chooses), then how can 
human beings hope to have any confident understanding of the rules that govern 
the whole universe? What these anomalies demonstrate, according to Holcot, is that 
a comprehensive knowledge of “the dispositions of the stars” (of the kind claimed 
by Solomon and promised by Chaucer’s Eagle) is simply not attainable by any 
mortal human being.18  
Holcot boldly acknowledges that this conclusion is contrary both to the letter of 
the text that he is explicating (i.e. Wisdom 7) and to the opinions of “all astronomers” 
(“omnes astronomi”); but he goes on to suggest a solution to this difficulty – in 
effect, a tertium quid – by proposing that scientific knowledge of the motions of the 
stars is possible, but only to the extent that God chooses not to alter these motions 
by means of a miracle (“miraculose”), and this is something which, implicitly, he 
can do at any time: 
In relation to this question it should be said that there can be some 
knowledge of the movements of the stars – not indeed proof of how they 
will be moved at every given moment, but proof of how they are moved at 
every given movement according to nature, 19 unless and until God disposes 
otherwise by means of a miracle, just as the blessed Augustine teaches. 20 In 
this way God establishes the movements and21 operations of all created 
things, in such a way that they might nevertheless function or not function 
in whatever way he wishes. (Lection 98: V, p. 86vb; O, fol. 151rb) 
This passage could reasonably be seen as an illustration of Holcot’s characteristic 
scepticism, his questioning of any (human) claims to certainty of knowledge, and 
his dislike of anything resembling a deterministic view of the universe, according 
to which the structure of things is so fixed and inevitable as to present people, 
implicitly, with an excuse for moral passivity. This point of view he clearly 
expresses in Lection 147:  
Many confess their wickedness, but in a way that is contrary to God. For 
when they are discovered in their sins, they say22 “It wasn’t me who did 
this”, or else “this isn’t a sin”, but rather “God wished it”. Others say, “It 
was done to me by Fate, it was done to me by the stars”, and thus by a 
roundabout route they seek to find a way of accusing God – for he created 
the stars, and set them on their courses; and in this way, by means of the 
stars, they try to show that it was God who made them sin. But anyone who 
is truly penitent says, “It was me who sinned: it was not Fate or Fortune or 
the Devil who drove me to it, but rather I consented to temptation.” (V, p. 
128rb; O, fol. 222vb) 
It is scepticism of this kind that seems to have made Holcot into an intellectual 
opponent of Thomas Bradwardine, whose monumental theological treatise, De 
causa Dei, explicitly contests the views of those thinkers whom Bradwardine 
regarded as “Pelagians” (i.e. believers in the principle that human will is capable of 
good even without the assistance of divine grace) and among whom he seems to 
have counted Holcot.23 Holcot’s position was however, one with which Chaucer 
seems to had considerable sympathy, as is suggested by the notably critical stance 
towards belief in determinism that he seems to adopt in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale and 
Troilus and Criseyde. 24  At the very least, this passage from the Wisdom-
commentary reveals how philosophical sensitivities could be attached to the 
question of whether anyone could accurately know how the stars “arn set in hevene” 
(House of Fame, line 1008). The comparison could be taken to suggest that 
Chaucer’s invention of a pretext for rejecting the Eagle’s invitation is not merely 
playful, but also philosophically aware. In effect, he brings his readers to the point 
at which Holcot makes scientific knowledge of the stars seem as if it might become 
a theologically controversial issue, and then beats a tactful, but witty, retreat.  
If Chaucer knew Holcot’s discussion of knowledge of the movements of the stars 
(“de motibus stellarum… scientia”) in Lection 98 of the Wisdom-commentary, then 
it is likely that he was also aware of Holcot’s attempt, earlier in this same Lection, 
at distinguishing between the true knowledge (“scientia vera”) represented by 
Solomon’s wisdom and the false knowledge (“scientia falsa”) characteristic of 
those various kinds of charlatan who lay claim to be able to use astrology or magic 
as a means of accessing a superhuman understanding of the workings of the 
universe: 
“For [Solomon says that] he” – i.e. God – has generously “given me true 
knowledge of the things that are” – i.e., complete knowledge of all created 
things, 25 which is a true knowledge, and not a false26 or apparent knowledge, 
of the kind that false experimenters, necromancers and alchemists boast 
about possessing, and also those who glory in being instructed in the 
teaching of demons by means of infamous art, and those who claim to know 
what they do not know, among whom are prestidigitators, diviners, 
dreamers,27 physiognomists, palm-readers, geomancers,28  enchanters and 
magicians, whose knowledge is not true knowledge, but false – indeed, no 
knowledge at all. (Lection 98; V, fol. 86va; O, fol. 150va) 
This list clearly invites comparison with a passage that occurs in the House of Fame 
not long after the Chaucerian narrator’s first encounter with the Eagle, where we 
are told that Fame’s court also included: 
…jugelours, 
Magiciens, and tregetours, 
And Phitonesses, charmeresses,  
Olde wicches, sorceresses 
That use exorsisacions 
And eke these fumygacions – 
And clerkes eke, which konne wel 
Al this magik naturel, 
That craftely doon her ententes 
To make, in certeyn ascendentes, 
Ymages, lo, thrugh which magik, 
To make a man ben hool or syk.” (The House of Fame, lines 1259-
70) 
Like Holcot, Chaucer’s list includes not just prestidigitators (“jugelours” and 
“tregetours”) and magicians (“magiciens”), but also those who summon demons 
(“sorceresses/ That use exorsicacions”). Although Chaucer does not explicitly state 
that all of these miscreants are representative of “false knowledge”, it is perhaps 
this line of thought that explains why these people are to be found at the court of 
Fame at all, since the particular function of this court, as Chaucer imagines it, seems 
to be to disseminate knowledge of all kinds, including knowledge that is false, or 
indeed “no knowledge at all”, as Holcot puts it (“falsa, imo nulla”).  
Where Chaucer departs most substantially from the model provided by Holcot 
in Lection 98 is in his invocation of those clerks whose “natural magic” 29  is 
expressed particularly by their use of astrological “ymages” which, he says, could 
restore health, or remove it (“To make a man ben hool or syk”). Such magical 
talismans derive their power from the fact that they give a physical embodiment to 
their creators’ supposedly privileged knowledge of the stars. They could be 
manufactured only at moments when the stars were aligned in what were deemed 
to be particularly propitious ways. Images of this kind are mentioned by Chaucer 
in the General Prologue, where the Physician is said to be well able to “fortunen the 
ascendent/ Of his ymages for his pacient” (I 417-18). They are also implicitly 
appear in the Squire’s Tale, where the manufacturer of the brass steed is said to 
have “wayted many a constellacion/ Er he had doon this operacion,/ And knew ful 
many a seel and many a bond” (V 129-31). Discussion of  “ymages” of this kind 
can be found in a large number of fourteenth-century texts, so it is by no means 
necessarily the case that Chaucer’s knowledge of them could only have been 
supplied by Holcot.30 For example, Chaucer makes clear in the Treatise on the 
Astrolabe that he was familiar Nicholas of Lynn’s Kalendarium,31  a text that 
specifically explains how “images and sculptures are made in stones so that they 
may receive the worth of precious stones from the influence of heaven”.32 In Nick 
Havely’s edition of the House of Fame, the images made “in certeyn ascendentes” 
are explained by a reference to Richard Kieckhefer’s book on magic, where it is 
noted that the Parisian theologian, Jean Gerson, wrote a whole treatise against a 
physician who had tried to heal a kidney disease by using a talisman inscribed with 
the image of a lion and certain special characters.33 As it happens, the attempt to 
explain The House of Fame by reference to Gerson is probably something of an 
unnecessary detour, since – as I shall explain in a moment – it is likely that Gerson’s 
understanding of such talismans was, just like Chaucer’s, directly conditioned by 
his familiarity with Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary. 
Chaucer’s reference to astrological images in The House of Fame cannot have 
been inspired by Holcot’s Lection 98 (because there is no mention of such images 
in that particular Lection), but they are nevertheless quite prominent elsewhere in 
the Wisdom-commentary; and so much so that I suggest that Chaucer was at this 
point in The House of Fame consciously moving from one distinctively Holcottian 
theme to another. The most extended discussion of astrological images in the 
Wisdom-commentary can be found in Lection 159,34  where it forms part of a 
discussion of idolatry. Holcot begins his discussion of Wisdom 13: 17-19 here with 
a condemnation of the “manifold foolishness of superstitiously worshipping idols”, 
but much of his subsequent discussion is based on the views of St Augustine. As he 
explains, “those who observe future events by means of signs that in no way 
ordained to them35 are condemned at length by St Augustine in Book II of St 
Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, who says that such observations are 
superstitious”.36 St Augustine does indeed discuss such superstitions in some detail, 
and he specifically considers the “amulets and remedies which the medical 
profession also condemns, whether these consist of incantations, or certain marks 
which their exponents call ‘characters’ or in putting certain objects into necklaces 
and ties”.37  Here St Augustine is concerned with omens of all kinds, not just 
medical “amulets and remedies”, and he goes on to provide an amusing list of 
examples: 
Besides these are thousands of utterly futile practices [e.g. …] treading on 
the threshold when you pass in front of your own house; going back to bed 
if you sneeze while putting on your shoes; returning inside your house if 
you trip up while leaving it; or, when your clothing is eaten by mice, 
worrying more about the premonition of future disaster than about the 
present damage. Cato had a witty saying about this: when approached by 
someone who said that mice had been nibbling his slippers he replied that 
this was not an omen, but would certainly have been if the slippers had been 
nibbling the mice.38 
Holcot offers quite a full summary of all of St Augustine’s views on this topic, 
including even the story that the saint told about Cato. He cites: 
those who are afraid, when they see that their slippers39 have been nibbled 
by mice, that some unfortunate event is about to occur. In relation to this we 
read how Cato40 mocked someone who told him that his slippers being 
nibbled by mice was a marvellous41 omen of misfortune.42 “Certainly, that’s 
no marvel”, said Cato: “but it would have been a marvel if the slippers had 
been nibbling the mice.” A similar case is the man who when getting up in 
the morning goes back to bed because he sneezed before he could put his 
shoes on. (Lection 159: V, pp. 136rb-va; O, fol. 236vb) 
It was probably St Augustine’s reference to “amulets” and “characters” that 
provided Holcot with the inspiration for offering his own discussion of the making 
of astrological images, a discussion which culminates with a reference to the story 
of the Golden Lion. This is the same story that was later discussed by Jean Gerson:  
But as to those astrological images that are made at certain times when the 
planets are determined to be in particular positions, it is doubtful whether it 
is licit to make images, or, having made them, to use them, just as a certain 
person in London in my lifetime was said to have been healed of quintain 
fever43 by means of the image of a golden lion manufactured in accordance 
with a certain constellation.44 (Lection 159: V, 136va; O, fol. 237rb) 
It is surely no coincidence that Gerson’s treatise Contra superstitionem sculpturae 
Leonis deploys exactly the same Augustinian arguments as Holcot does. Gerson 
certainly knew Holcot’s work, since he cites him elsewhere, on one occasion 
describing him (rather uncharitably) as the “imitator of Ockham”.45 It is therefore 
very likely that Gerson owed his knowledge of the story of the Golden Lion directly 
to Holcot.  
In Holcot’s analysis of astrological talismans, the precise issue is not whether or 
not they can be efficacious: but rather, whether it is permissible for Christians to 
make use of them at all. In this respect, he is actually rather less sceptical about 
such things than St Augustine, although it certainly remains significant that he 
locates the whole discussion in relation to the Book of Wisdom’s attack on idolatry: 
Indeed it is true that things in nature derive their forms and powers from 
celestial bodies, but artificial images can derive no power from celestial 
bodies,46 nor indeed do they command any other47 power, except what it is 
inherent in the nature of their material. The image depicted is not in itself a 
principle capable of causing change, and therefore the gold of this particular 
image [i.e. the lion] has no more power than the gold of any other image. 
However, if it does have any other effect, this is because of the involvement 
of demons who delude human beings, as St Augustine says. And to this 
extent such astrological images allot their power with the help of demons. 
This is indicated by the fact that it is necessary for such images to be 
imprinted with certain characters, which do not have any effect naturally. 
Whence it should be understood that 48  astrological images differ from 
necromantic ones in this: that in the making of necromantic images, certain 
invocations to demons are expressly employed. Thus such images49 pertain 
to contracts expressly entered into with demons. Whereas in the making of 
astronomical images the contracts with demons are tacit, brought about by 
certain characters and figures devised by these same demons – who, to 
enable the making such characters, give aid to their makers. (Lection 159; 
V, fol. 136vb; O, fols 237rb-237va) 
Just as Holcot suggests, St Augustine does indeed have a considerable amount to 
say about demons in this context. He even states that observing “signs” in this way 
(i.e. omens and portents) amounts to a contract with demons, “a disastrous alliance 
of men and devils”. Holcot finesses this a little by arguing that the proof of the 
diabolical nature of astrological images can be found in the very use of “characters” 
(written or inscribed signs). He suggests that the difference between astrologers and 
necromancers is that, whereas a necromancer expressly invokes a pact with demons 
by using particular incantations, an astrologer also makes such a pact, but only 
tacitly, by means of these characters. From this perspective, it is perhaps easy to see 
why Chaucer includes users of astrological images among the list of magical 
charlatans in the House of Fame; and why he then immediately goes on to talk about 
sorcerers like Medea and Simon Magus (lines 1271-74). It could also be argued that 
Chaucer’s general attitude to such things resembles Holcot’s precisely in its 
ambivalence. Both men are very interested in the idea of celestial influence, and 
much more reluctant than St Augustine, say, to deny outright the effectiveness of 
talismans like the Golden Lion, or to dismiss belief in the power of such objects as 
mere superstition. At the same time both express horror at the very idea of magical 
practices of this kind. Thus it is that in the Franklin’s Tale, for example, Chaucer 
can present the clerk of Orléans as a man whose knowledge of the stars clearly 
endows him with at least some magical power – because he succeeds in removing 
the rocks of Brittany – while at the same time condemning him for “his 
wrecchednesse/ Of swich a supersticious cursedness” (FrankT, V. 1270-72). 
However there is a further twist to Holcot’s argument – and it is a very distinctive 
one. This comes when he asks about the little letters and packages containing words 
from the gospels or the psalms that sick people wear around their necks: 
But furthermore, concerning the little letters and packages containing the 
words of the gospels or the psalter placed around the necks of sick people, 
can50 there be any doubt about whether these are superstitious? It should be 
said that there is no harm to it, as long as such words are copied precisely 
from the gospel, in order that God might more promptly bring aid to the 
patient wearing them on account of their devotion. But if you believe51 that 
such words cure fevers and mitigate the falling sickness because of their 
intrinsic power, or similarly if these words are mixed with mysterious 
characters 52  and strange names, or if 53  the person wearing them is not 
allowed to know what is written, then there is no doubt: here indeed is 
superstition. Whence St John Chrysostom says in his commentary on St 
Matthew’s Gospel: “There are some who wear a copy of a particular extract 
from the Gospel around their necks. Is the Gospel not constantly54 read55 in 
church, and heard by all? If the words of the Gospel achieve nothing when 
they are in the ears56 of such people,57 how can they help them when they 
are around their necks?”58 (Lection 159; V, fol. 136vb; O, fol. 237va) 
It is not just that Holcot is reluctant to condemn practices that are clearly pious at 
least in their intent (despite what could be construed as an attempt to use the words 
of the bible as if they were magical “characters”). What also lies behind this, it 
seems, is his awareness of the charge to which his sceptical tendencies seemingly 
laid him open: the charge that, in emphasising human autonomy and freewill to the 
extent that he does, he leaves little or no room for God’s grace. Holcot’s treatment 
of this particular question – the question of the value of biblical talismans – is 
notably careful. He says that such practices are certainly superstitious if they 
involve the mixing of the words of the bible with nonsensical or extraneous 
“characters”, but he is careful not to say that they cannot be efficacious at all. 
Instead he cites St John Chrysostom (probably via Aquinas), 59  and builds on 
Chrysostom’s arguments in order to ask:  
In what, then, does the power of the words of the gospel reside? In the 
shapes of the letters or in the understanding of their senses? If in the shapes, 
then it is good for them to be hung around people’s necks. If in the 
understanding, then it is better that they be placed in people’s hearts than 
hung around their necks. (Lection 159; V, fol. 136vb; O, fol. 237va) 
Lection 159’s departures from its Augustinian model are significant to studies 
of Chaucer because it is apparently Holcot’s development of the saint’s scepticism 
about the “thousands of utterly futile practices” related to omens that underlies 
Chaucer’s discussion of magical practices in the Parson’s Tale: 
But lat us go now to thilke horrible sweryng of adjuracioun and 
conjuracioun, as doon thise false enchauntours or nigromanciens in bacyns 
ful of water, or in a bright swerd, in a cercle, or in a fir, or in a shulder-boon 
of a sheep. I kan nat seye but that they doon cursedly and dampnably agayns 
Crist and al the feith of hooly chirche. What seye we of hem that bileeven 
on divynailes, as by flight or by noyse of briddes, or of beestes, or by sort, 
by nigromancie, by dremes, by chirkynge of dores or crakkynge of houses, 
by gnawynge of rattes, and swich manere wrecchednesse? Certes, al this 
thyng is deffended by God and by hooly chirche. For which they been 
acursed, til they come to amendement, that on swich filthe setten hire 
bileeve. Charmes for woundes or maladie of men or of beestes, if they taken 
any effect, it may be peraventure that God suffreth it, for folk sholden yeve 
the moore feith and reverence to his name. (ParsT, X 602-607)60 
Here we see what is an effect a reworking of St Augustine’s condemnation of 
superstitious “signs” – including a reference to the gnawing of rats, which in this 
context can be taken to correspond with the mice who eat slippers. However, it is a 
reworking that clearly reflects the influence of Holcot’s mediation of St Augustine. 
It is only in Holcot’s Lection 159, and in Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale – but not in St 
Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine – that the line of thought moves directly from 
omens like nibbling mice to “charmes for woundes or maladie”. It is again only in 
this Lection and in the Tale – but not in On Christian Doctrine – that any thought 
is given to the possibility that such charms might actually be efficacious. The 
Parson’s sudden shift from the effect of charms to their exemplary potential, as a 
means of instilling “faith and reverence” – for which there is again no clear parallel 
in St Augustine – appears to reflect Holcot’s deployment of Chrysostom’s 
suggestion that the apparent power of the words of the gospel properly lies in 
people’s hearts. On the other hand, there is nothing that Chaucer could have taken 
from St Augustine in this passage that is not also in Holcot: which means that 
Chaucer need not have been reading St Augustine directly at all. The most 
parsimonious explanation for this accumulation of parallels, both large and small, 
is that Chaucer knew Lectio 159 of Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary, and knew it 
well.  
What I have argued in this essay is that the reluctance of the Chaucerian narrator 
in The House of Fame to take advantage of the eagle’s offer of a privileged insight 
into the workings of the stars (lines 991-1017) possibly reflects Holcot’s sceptical 
emphasis on the limits of scientific knowledge about the universe in Lection 98 of 
the Wisdom-commentary; that this same Lection could well have provided Chaucer 
with a model for the list of magical/astrological charlatans in The House of Fame 
(lines 1259-70); and that the one element of Chaucer’s description of such 
charlatans that is conspicuously absent from Lection 98 – i.e., the emphasis on the 
“ymages” or talismans – can actually be paralleled elsewhere in the Wisdom-
commentary, in Lection 159. Although Lection 159 relies heavily on St Augustine’s 
analysis of superstitious practices, including the observation of omens and portents, 
the conjuring of demons and the use of amulets and talismans, it departs from the 
Augustinian model in moving towards a consideration of the ways in which the use 
of “ymages” might not be wholly ineffective or wicked. Holcot also adds to St 
Augustine’s views by arguing that even when the intent is good – even when the 
use of such “ymages” is expressive of piety, rather than idolatry – such practices 
are less significant than the attitudes of mind they express. This distinctively 
Holcottian revision of the Augustinian analysis of superstition in Lection 159 seems 
to have left its mark on Chaucer’s discussion of magical practices in the Parson’s 
Tale (X 602-607), and it is likely to have provided the immediate source for it. In 
particular, Holcot’s reshaping of St Augustine’s argument towards an emphasis on 
the effect of such charms on the hearts of believers is reflected by Chaucer’s 
speculative suggestion that God tolerates the use of “charmes” only so that “folk 
sholden yeve the moore feith and reverence to his name”. 
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